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Recent advances in wireless networking technologies, along with ubiquitous sensing and computing, have brought significant
convenience for location-based services. The localization issue in wireless sensor networks under the nonadversarial scenario
has already been well studied. However, most existing localization schemes cannot provide satisfied performance under the
adversarial scenario. In this paper, we propose three attack-resistant localization schemes, called basic TSCD, enhanced TSCD
and mobility-aided TSCD secure localization schemes, respectively, to stand against the distance-consistent spoofing attack in
wireless sensor networks. The idea behind the basic TSCD scheme is to adopt the temporal and spatial properties of locators to
detect some attacked locators firstly and then utilize the consistent property of the detected attacked locators to identify other
attacked locators. Enhanced TSCD and mobility-aided TSCD schemes are designed based on the basic TSCD scheme to improve
the performance. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed schemes outperform other existing approaches under the
same network parameters.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1] have increasingly
drawn attentions of researchers in the areas of wireless
communication, sensor technology, distributed systems, and
embedded computing. These sensor networks consist of a
large number of low-cost, low-power, and multifunctional
sensor nodes that communicate through wireless media.
Various WSN applications have been proposed, for example,
military target tracking, environment monitoring, medical
treatment, emergency rescue and smart home, and so forth.
A fundamental requirement in the above applications is the
location awareness of the system. Therefore, the acquisition
of sensors’ location becomes an important issue since sensing
results without location information are mostly inapplicable.
Considering the nature of random deployment of most
sensor networks, it is laborious, if not impossible, to prede-
termine the location of each sensor node before deployment.
A common approach in most localization schemes is to
use enough special nodes, called locators or beacons, which
can obtain their locations by GPS or from infrastructure.
Locations of normal sensor nodes are then estimated by
interacting with locators to obtain the distance or angle
information. Once the location information of at least three
noncollinear locators are available, the relative positions of
the sensors can be converted into physical positions.
Energy eﬃciency, accuracy and security account for
the major metrics in localization systems. The former two
metrics have already been investigated for nearly a decade
and a large amount of achievements [2–4] have been
published. The security, however, has been addressed only in
recent years. In practice, localization schemes in WSNs may
work under the adversarial scenario where malicious attacks
exist. For example, a simple replay attack [5] can modify
the distance measurement, leading to the malfunction of the
localization schemes. Therefore, it is necessary to design a
secure localization scheme which can be competent in the
hostile environment.
There are many diﬀerent kinds of attackers in the
hostile wireless sensor networks. Generally, these attackers
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can be classified into two categories, external attackers and
internal attackers [6]. External attackers can distort the
network behavior without the system’s authentication, while
internal attackers are authenticated ones, and thus, more
dangerous to the system security. Most attacks in WSNs
are coming from the aforementioned two types of attackers.
For instance, the wormhole attack [7] is conducted by
two colluding external attackers, and the false position and
distance dissemination attack [8] is accomplished by an
internal attacker.
In range-based localization procedure, the internal
attackers can revise the measured distances randomly to
disrupt the localization. This kind of attack can be defended
using the consistency check method proposed in [9]. How-
ever, if the attackers do not revise the measured distances
randomly, but make the modified distances be consistent,
which is called the distance-consistent spoofing attack, the
strategy proposed in [9] will be failed under this scenario. In
this paper, the distance-consistent spoofing attack in WSNs is
therefore investigated, based on which we propose an attack-
resistant localization scheme, called basic TSCD (Temporal
Spatial Consistent based Detection) secure localization. By
further exploring the consistency and the mobility properties
of the sensor, enhanced TSCD and mobility-aided TSCD
schemes are proposed, respectively, to improve the localiza-
tion performance. Simulation results demonstrate that our
proposed schemes achieve better performance than existing
approaches under the same network settings.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
(i) We address a new distance-consistent spoofing attack
which can easily attack the localization in WSNs,
(ii) We summarize four secure properties of a WSN when
it is under the distance-consistent spoofing attack,
(iii) We propose three secure localization schemes, which
make use of these properties to detect and defend
against the distance-consistent spoofing attack,
(iv) We conduct theoretical analysis on the probability
of identifying all the attacked locators, which is
validated by simulations,
(v) We analyze the eﬀects of network parameters on the
performance of our proposed schemes and compare
them with other existing methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide the related work on secure localization.
Section 3 gives the problem statement and Section 4 sum-
marizes four secure properties of wireless communication
in WSNs. In Section 5, the basic TSCD, enhanced TSCD,
and mobility-aided TSCD schemes are proposed as well as
the theoretical analysis. Section 6 presents the performance
evaluation and Section 7 concludes the paper and puts
forward our future work.
2. Related Work
There have been some recent achievements [5] on secure
localization. In [10], message authentication is used to
prevent wholesale beacon location report forgeries, and a
location reporting algorithm is proposed to minimize the
impact of compromised beacons. Lazos et al. propose a
robust positioning system called ROPE [11] that allows
sensors to determine their locations without centralized
computation. In addition, ROPE provides a location veri-
fication mechanism that verifies the location claims of the
sensors before data collection. DRBTS [12] is a distributed
reputation-based beacon trust security protocol aimed at
providing secure localization in sensor networks. Based on a
quorum voting approach, DRBTS drives beacons to monitor
each other and then enables them to decide which should be
trusted.
To provide secure location services, Liu et al. [13]
introduce a suit of techniques to detect malicious beacons
that supply incorrect information to sensor nodes. These
techniques include a method to detect malicious beacon
signals, techniques to detect replayed beacon signals, the
identification of malicious beacons, the avoidance of false
detections, and the revoking of malicious beacons. By clus-
tering of benign location reference beacons, Wang et al. [14]
propose a resilient localization scheme that is computational
eﬃciency. In [15], robust statistical methods are proposed,
including triangulation and RF-based fingerprinting, to
make localization attack-tolerant. SPINE [8] is a range-based
positioning system that enables verifiable multilateration
and verification of positions of mobile devices for secure
computation in the presence of attackers. In [16], a secure
localization scheme is presented to make the location
estimation of the sensor secure, by transmission of nonces at
diﬀerent power levels from the beacon nodes. In [17], Chen
et al. propose to make each locator build a conflicting-set and
then the sensor can use all conflicting sets of its neighboring
locators to filter out incorrect distance measurements of its
neighboring locators. The limitation of the scheme is that it
only works properly when the system has no packet loss. As
the attackers may drop the packets purposely, the packet loss
is inevitable when the system is under a wormhole attack.
The distance-consistency-based secure localization scheme
proposed in [18, 19] can also tolerate the packet loss.
By localizing the sensor node with directional anten-
nae equipped on locators, SeRLoc [20] is robust against
wormhole attacks, sybil attacks and sensor compromises. On
the basis of SeRLoc, HiRLoc [21] further utilizes antenna
rotations and multiple transmit power levels to provide
richer information for higher localization resolution. Liu et
al. [9] propose two secure localization schemes. The first
one is attack-resistant Minimum Mean Square Estimation,
which filters out malicious beacon signals by the consistency
check. The other one is voting-based location estimation.
However, SeRLoc requires directional antennae which are
complex in real deployment. The schemes in [9] would
fail under the distance-consistent spoofing attack when the
attacked location references are malicious colluding ones,
that is, consistent. The TSCD secure localization scheme,
proposed in this paper, is able to conquer both the two
drawbacks. It does not require any complex hardware, and
works well even when the revised distance measurements of
the attacked locators are consistent. In addition, it consumes
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less computation time than that of [9] while obtaining better
performance.
3. Problem Statement
In this section, the network model and related assumptions
as well as the localization approach are given, followed by the
attack model which we focus on.
3.1. Network Model. We assume that there are three types
of nodes in a WSN, namely locators, sensors, and attackers,
respectively. The locators are location-fixed nodes which
know their coordinates after deployment. The sensors,
while continuously moving around the network, estimate
their own locations by measuring distances to neighboring
locators. Each sensor and locator has its own unique identi-
fication and they also share a hash function which is used for
the verification (we will describe it in next subsection). The
attackers, known as adversarial nodes, intentionally disturb
the localization procedure of the sensors. A pair of attackers
can collude to spoof a sensor in the network. We assume
that all the nodes in the network have the same transmission
range R. However, the communication range between two
colluded attackers is unlimited as they can communicate
with each other using certain communication technique.
We also assume that the locators are deployed indepen-
dently with a density of ρl, and the probability that a sensor
hears k locators follows the Poisson distribution: P(LS =
k) = ((πR2ρl)k/k!)e−πR2ρl . Each locator is able to measure
the distances to neighboring sensors. The measurement error
follows a Gaussian distribution N(μ, σ2), where the mean μ
is 0 and the standard deviation σ is within a threshold. The
attackers also measure the distances to neighboring locators
and send the distance measurements to its colluder—another
attacker—to replay the measurements to a sensor in another
region, thus providing faulty measurements.
3.2. Localization Approach. As a sensor always moves around
in the network, it continuously changes its locations. When-
ever needed, the sensor can rely on the localization procedure
to determine its current position. The localization procedure
is as follows. The sensor maneuvers in the region, stops
and broadcasts a requesting signal Loc request including its
local timestamp ts to its neighboring locators whenever it
needs localization. Upon receiving the Loc request signal,
each locator, within the communication range of the sensor,
estimates the distances to the sensor based on the Loc request
signal (e.g., TDoA [3] or RSSI [22]). Then each locator
replies a Loc ack signal to the sensor which includes its ID,
the measured distance and H(ts), here H(·) denotes the hash
function shared by the nodes in the network. When receiving
the Loc ack signal from its neighboring locator, the sensor
will check whether the H(ts) in Loc ack is valid by comparing
it with its own generated hash number H(ts). The sensor will
only accept the verified Loc ack signal.
The sensor also measures the response time of each
locator during the above process to eliminate the random
delay at the MAC layer of the locators. Once enough distance
measurements obtained, the sensor starts location estimation
using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method
[23]: Assume that the coordinates of the n neighboring loca-
tors of the sensor are (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3), . . . , (xn, yn),
respectively, and the distance measurements from the n
locators to the sensor are d1, d2, d3, . . . , dn. Then the
location of the sensor, denoted as X =
[
x
y
]
, can be obtained
by
X =
(
ATA
)−1
ATb, (1)
where
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2(x1 − xn) 2
(
y1 − yn
)
2(x2 − xn) 2
(
y2 − yn
)
...
...
2(xn−1 − xn) 2
(
yn−1 − yn
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
b =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x21 − x2n + y21 − y2n − d21 + d2n
x22 − x2n + y22 − y2n − d22 + d2n
...
x2n−1 − x2n + y2n−1 − y2n − d2n−1 + d2n
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(2)
3.3. Attack Model. In this paper, we consider an adversarial
WSN where a pair of colluding attackers can launch a so-
called distance-consistent spoofing attack. In [9], the attacker
can only revise the distance measurement randomly to
disrupt the localization procedure. The distance consistency
check proposed in [9] claimed that all distance measure-
ments from neighboring locators to a sensor are consistent,
that is, these distance measurements can converge to an
identical location. Therefore, this distance consistency check
scheme can be used to resist such kind of attack eﬀectively
because the malicious distance measurements generated
by attacker will be inconsistent. In the distance-consistent
spoofing attack, to increase their capacity of localization
disrupting, the colluding attackers can deliberately revise the
distance measurement messages sent from all the attacked
locators and make the revised distance measurements fake a
virtual location, which makes the distance consistency check
scheme lose its eﬃcacy. Note that the attackers in this paper
belong to the internal attackers, which can revise the message
content in the network, but they are not able to compromise
any node in the network which requires more resource for
the attackers. For example, the attackers cannot obtain the
hash function H(·) shared by the nodes. Therefore, they
cannot generate fake messages for nonexisted locators due to
the verification procedure with H(ts).
An example of the distance-consistent spooking attack is
shown in Figure 1(a). As two colluding attackers A1 and A2
can communicate with each other via an attack link, locators
L4, L5 and L6 can, therefore, communicate with the sensor S
through the attack link. For L6, the Loc request signal sent
from S travels through the attack link to reach L6, and L6
responds a Loc ack signal. Attacker A1 measures the distance
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Figure 1: The attack scenarios in WSN. (a) Attacker model in range-based localization; (b) Attacked locators with temporal and spatial
properties.
to L6 as d6 after receiving the Loc ack signal. A1 forwards the
Loc ack signal with the distance measurement information
to A2 through the attack link. A2 modifies the distance
measurement information in the Loc ack signal to make
it consistent with others. For example, when A2 received
the message sent from L6 to S, if A2 modifies the distance
measurement information in the message to be d6 and relays
the message to S, S will consider the distance to L6 as d6
instead of the actual distance d′6. Similarly, S considers the
distances to L4 and L5 as d4 and d5, respectively, instead of the
actual distances d′4 and d
′
5. Consequently, the revised distance
measurements d4, d5 and d6 will be consistent, and they can
converge to an identical location, that is, the point of A1 in
Figure 1(a).
4. Secure Properties and
Corresponding Detection Schemes
In this section, we summarize the characteristics of a WSN as
four secure properties when it is under a distance-consistent
spoofing attack: the temporal property of the locators, the
spatial property of the locators, the consistent property
of the legitimate locators, and the consistent property of
the attacked locators. The detection schemes are therefore
proposed based on the corresponding properties. Though
the detection schemes based on the temporal and spatial
properties have been used in [20] and the detection scheme
based on the consistent property of legitimate locators has
been used in [9], we jointly use these properties to defend
against the distance-consistent spoofing attack.
4.1. Temporal Property and Corresponding Detection Scheme
4.1.1. Temporal Property. The sensor can receive at most
one message from the same locator for each localization
procedure. That is, if the sensor receives more than one
signals from a locator, this locator is attacked.
4.1.2. Detection Scheme D1 Based on Temporal Property. As
shown in Figure 1(b), suppose an attacked locator lies in
the shading domain S1, which is the common transmission
area of sensor S and attacker A1. When S broadcasts the
Loc request signal, L4 can hear it twice, one directly from S,
and the other from A1 which is replayed by A2 to A1 through
the attack link. L4 will also reply the Loc ack signal through
these two pathes. Therefore, S will receive more than one
messages from L4, based on which S can determine that L4
is attacked.
The sensor S can also diﬀerentiate the correct distance
message from the incorrect one based on the following
scheme: As the localization approach only countervails the
time delay at the MAC layer of the locators when measuring
the response time of the message, if the message goes through
the attack link, the MAC layer delay introduced by the two
attackers still exists. Therefore, the response time of the
revised Loc ack signal from L4 to S, which travels through the
attack link, will be longer than that of the original Loc ack
signal which travels from L4 to S directly. S will consider the
Loc ack signal with a shorter response time from a locator to
be correct while treating the other as attacked.
4.2. Spatial Property and Corresponding Detection Scheme
4.2.1. Spatial Property. The sensor cannot receive messages
from two diﬀerent locators for each localization procedure if
the distance between these two locators are larger than 2R.
That is, if the sensor has received messages from two locators
whose distance between each other is larger than 2R, one of
these two locators is attacked.
4.2.2. Detection Scheme D2 Based on Spatial Property. When
an attacked locator lies farther than 2R away from one of
the legitimate locators, the sensor can detect it based on the
spatial property. As shown in Figure 1(b), L5 is an attacked
locator which lies farther than 2R away from L1. S can detect
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that one of the two locators is attacked. To diﬀerentiate the
attacked locator from these two locators, observing that the
MAC layer delay introduced by the attackers will increase the
response time of the Loc ack signal sent from the attacked
locator, the response time of the message from the attacked
locator will be longer than the one from the legitimate
locator. Therefore, by comparing the response time of the
two locators, S can further determine that the locator with
a longer response time is the attacked one, which is L5 in this
case.
4.3. Consistent Property of Legitimate Locators and Corre-
sponding Detection Scheme
4.3.1. Consistent Property of Legitimate Locators. Assume
that the coordinates of the n locators are (x1, y1),
(x2, y2), (x3, y3), . . . , (xn, yn), and the distance measurements
from the n locators to the sensor are d1, d2,d3, . . . ,dn.
The estimated location of the sensor is (x˜, y˜). The mean
square error of the estimated location δ2 = ∑ni=1((di −√
(x˜ − xi)2 + ( y˜ − yi)2)2/n). The consistent property of legit-
imate locators means that the mean square error of the
location estimation, generated from legitimate distance mea-
surements, is lower than that containing malicious distance
measurements.
4.3.2. Detection Scheme D3 Based on Consistent Property
of Legitimate Locators. To detect the attacked locators, a
predefined threshold of the mean square error, τ2, has to
be determined in advance. The sensor estimates its location
based on distance measurements to all its neighboring
locators, and determines whether the mean square error
based on the estimation result is lower than the threshold.
If yes, the estimated result will be considered as correct;
otherwise, it calculates its location repeatedly using all
possible subsets of these locators with one fewer locator,
and chooses the subset with the least mean square error to
eliminate the locator which is out of the subset. The sensor
repeats the above process until the mean square error is lower
than the threshold or there are only 3 locators left. Note that
this scheme works only when the majority of locators are
legitimate.
4.4. Consistent Property of Attacked Locators and Correspond-
ing Detection Scheme
4.4.1. Consistent Property of Attacked Locators. The distance-
consistent spoofing attack can make the sensor measure
the distances to the attacked locators consistent to a fake
location. That is, the location estimation based on the
attacked locators has a low mean square error.
4.4.2. Detection Scheme D4 Based on Consistent Property of
Attacked Locators. If the sensor has already detected two
or more attacked locators, it can identify other attacked
locators using the consistent property of attacked locators.
Let Lts denote the set of attacked locators that have been
detected and Lr denote the set of remaining locators. The
sensor repeats to select one locator Li from Lr each time
and calculates the mean square error based on Lts ∪ {Li}. If
the mean square error is lower than the threshold τ2, Li is
considered as an attacked one; otherwise, Li is considered as
a legitimate one. The sensor repeats this until all locators in
Lr have been checked.
5. TSCD Secure Localization Schemes
In this section, we propose three novel schemes that apply the
properties described in the previous section. We first propose
a secure localization scheme, namely basic TSCD (B-TSCD),
which applies the temporal property, spatial property, and
consistent property of attacked locators. Based on B-TSCD,
we also propose an enhanced TSCD (E-TSCD) scheme which
further applies the consistent property of legitimate locators.
Another extended scheme, called mobility-aided TSCD (M-
TSCD), is further designed to improve the overall perfor-
mance. At the end, we analyze the theoretical probability of
identifying all the attacked locators and the computational
complexity of these schemes.
5.1. Basic TSCD Secure Localization. As mentioned above,
the idea behind the B-TSCD scheme is to apply the
temporal property, spatial property, and consistent property
of attacked locators to detect all attacked locators. The sensor
first applies both temporal and spatial properties to detect
some attacked locators. If two or more attacked locators are
successfully detected, the sensor can identify other attacked
locators based on their consistency. After attacked locators
are removed, the sensor can conduct the localization based
on the remaining locators.
The procedure of B-TSCD is listed in Algorithm 1. When
the sensor requires the location estimation, it broadcasts
the Loc request message to the network, and waits for the
Loc ack messages from neighboring locators. If it receives
Loc ack messages from the same locator more than once,
it uses the detection scheme D1 to distinguish the correct
distance measurement and the spoofing distance measure-
ment. Meanwhile, when it receives Loc ack signals from
neighboring locators, it checks whether there are two locators
whose distance between each other is larger than 2R. If yes,
it uses the detection scheme D2 to identify the legitimate
locator and the attacked one. If the sensor has successfully
detected at least two attacked locators, it further uses the
detection scheme D4 to detect all other locators. When all
neighboring locators are checked, the sensor conducts the
MLE localization based on the remaining locators.
5.2. Enhanced TSCD Secure Localization. In the B-TSCD
scheme, if the sensor fails to detect at least two attacked
locators based on the detection schemes D1 and D2, it
cannot use the detection scheme D4. It then conducts the
localization using the remaining locators. However, there
may still exist some attacked locators undetected, leading
to the deterioration of the localization. The enhanced
TSCD secure localization (E-TSCD) scheme is based on
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(1) Broadcast the Loc request message.
(2) Wait for the Loc ack message, conduct the distance
estimation and calculate the response time of each locator.
(3) Use the detection schemes D1 and D2 to detect attacked locators.
(4) if the detected attacked locators ≥ 2 then
(5) Use the detection scheme D4 to detect other attacked locators.
(6) end if
(7) Conduct the MLE localization based on the remaining locators.
Algorithm 1: Basic TSCD secure localization scheme.
the observation that if the sensor cannot use the detection
schemes D1 and D2 to detect two attacked locators, the
sensor most likely has more legitimate neighboring locators
than undetected attacked ones. Therefore, if the sensor has
detected fewer than two attacked locators, it can further use
the detection scheme D3 to detect other attacked ones.
The procedure of the E-TSCD is shown in Algorithm 2.
The sensor firstly uses the schemes D1 and D2 to detect
attacked locators. If the number of detected attacked locators
is over two, the detection scheme D4 is used to detect other
attacked locators; otherwise, the sensor uses the detection
scheme D3 to eliminate other attacked locators. At the end,
the MLE localization based on the remaining locators is used
to obtain the location result. Note that we do not use those
attacked locators detected from the detection scheme D3
as a priori for conducting the detection scheme D4. Those
locators are considered “attacked” because they are beyond
the distance consistency threshold. However, these excesses
might be not due to the attack, but other reasons, such as the
measurement error.
5.3. Mobility-Aided TSCD Secure Localization. As the sensor
moves around, it may need to conduct the localization pro-
cess continuously because its location continues changing.
We assume that a sensor periodically conducts the localiza-
tion process and marks itself a state after the localization.
The sensor marks itself with an attacked state if it detects
any attacked locator; otherwise, it marks itself with a safe
state. Thus, there will be four possible state transitions
for the two consecutive states of a sensor, which is shown
in Figure 2: (1) from previous safe state to current safe
state; (2) from previous safe state to current attacked state;
(3) from previous attacked state to current safe state; and
(4) from previous attacked state to current attacked state.
Although the historical data obtained from the previous
secure localization process may not be useful in the former
three state transitions, it can be used in the last state
transition to assist the sensor to detect the current attacked
locators.
We propose an extended secure localization scheme,
called mobility-aided TSCD (M-TSCD), which allows a
sensor to utilize its historical data to detect the current
attacked locators. For the sensor, if it detects some attacked
locators based on the temporal and spatial properties, it
knows that it is currently in an attacked state. Then, it
checks its historical data and treats all those detected attacked
locators in the previous state as the attacked locators in the
current state. It also records the current detected attacked
locators as the historical data for the next state. Otherwise,
if it detects no attacked locator, it empties the historical
data. Since the attacked locators recorded in the historical
data for the previous state are also considered attacked on
the current state, it increases the probability that a sensor
detects at least two attacked locators. If the detected attacked
locators are more than two, the sensor can use the detection
scheme D4 to detect other attacked locators; otherwise,
it uses the detection scheme D3 to detect other attacked
locators. Finally, it conducts the MLE localization based on
the remaining locators. The procedure of M-TSCD is shown
in Algorithm 3.
Note that there is a precondition for the M-TSCD
scheme, which assumes that the distance between two
consecutive localization processes is relatively short so that
when a distance-consistent spoofing attack occurs on the
current state it is impossible for another diﬀerent distance-
consistent spoofing attack to occur on the previous state or
the next state. In other words, if the sensor is attacked on
both the previous state and current state, these two attacks
come from the same attack source and they attack the same
group of locators. This precondition makes sense when the
density of the attack sources is low and the behavior of the
attack sources does not change dramatically.
5.4. Probability of Identifying All Attacked Locators. To ana-
lyze the probability of identifying all the attacked locators for
the B-TSCD scheme, we assume for simplicity that the sensor
can achieve this goal if it can detect at least two attacked
locators. We denote the disk with center U and radius R
as DR(U). As illustrated in Figure 3, the overlapped region
of the transmission areas of the sensor S and attacker A1 is
denoted as S1.
As shown in Figure 3, when the sensor is under the
distance-consistent spoofing attack, the probability that it
lies in the region dxdy equals to dx dy/πR2. Assuming
that the sensor can identify m attacked locators using the
detection scheme D1 and identify n attacked locators using
the detection scheme D2, the probability that the sensor can
identify at least two attacked locators using schemes D1 and
D2 can be calculated as
Pxy = 1− P(m = 0)P(n = 0)− P(m = 0)P(n = 1)
− P(m = 1)P(n = 0),
(3)
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(1) Broadcast the Loc request message.
(2) Wait for the Loc ack message, conduct the distance
estimation and calculate the response time of each locator.
(3) Use the detection schemes D1 and D2 to detect attacked locators.
(4) if the detected attacked locators ≥ 2 then
(5) Use the detection scheme D4 to detect other attacked locators.
(6) else
(7) Use the detection scheme D3 to detect other attacked locators.
(8) end if
(9) Conduct the MLE localization based on the remaining locators.
Algorithm 2: Enhanced TSCD secure localization scheme.
1 S
A 4
2
3
Figure 2: State transitions of the sensor in a WSN under the
distance-consistent spoofing attack. S and A denote the safe state
and attacked state, respectively.
where
P(m = 0) = e−S1ρl ,
P(m = 1) = S1ρle−S1ρl ,
P(n = 0) = e−S2ρl ,
P(n = 1) = S2ρle−S2ρl .
(4)
Here, S2 is the region in DR(A1) which is more than
2R away from at least one of the locators in DR(S), that is,
the area of the corresponding shadow region S2 in Figure 3.
Note that all the locators in DR(A1) are attacked by the
distance-consistent spoofing attack, and if any locator lies in
S2, the sensor can identify it as an attacked locator using the
detection scheme D4.
Thus, we can obtain
P = 1
πR2
∫∫
DR(A2)\S1
Pxydx dy, (5)
where
Pxy = 1− e−(S1+S2)ρl
[
1 + (S1 + S2)ρl
]
,
S1 = 2R2arccos L2R − L
√√√√
(
R2 − L
2
4
)
.
(6)
L is the distance between S and A1 as shown in Figure 3.
For the E-TSCD and M-TSCD schemes, the probability
of identifying all the attacked locators cannot be explicitly
represented as a mathematical formula. However, the proba-
bility P obtained from the B-TSCD scheme can be considered
as the lower bound of that probability for these two schemes.
6. Simulation Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed schemes in terms of the probability of successful
localization and time consumption. The localization is
considered successful if the distance diﬀerence between the
estimated position and the real position of the sensor is less
than a threshold. Because of the existence of the distance
measurement error, the sensor’s position estimated by the
localization algorithm cannot be the same as its real position
even there has no attack at all. When the attack exists,
the sensor’s estimated position may be further deviated.
Therefore, we consider the localization of the sensor to
be successful under the attack if the distance between the
estimated position without the attack and the real position,
say d1, and the distance between the estimated position
with the attack detection and the real position, say d2,
satisfy the condition d2 ≤ 2d1. That is, the localization
is considered successful if the impact of the attack on
the localization is bounded by the double of the distance
measurement error. We also interest in the time consumption
cost of the proposed algorithms considering the energy-
constrained nature of sensor nodes. As the communication
cost is similar among diﬀerent algorithms, the diﬀerence of
time consumption cost indicates the eﬀectiveness of these
algorithms.
We adopt the following parameters in our simulation: the
transmission range R = 15 m; the density of locators ρl =
0.006/m2 (with the average degree of the network equals to
4.24); the standard deviation of the distance measurement
error σ = 0.5; the threshold of the mean square error used
in the consistent property is 1. The label L/R of the x axis
denotes the ratio of the distance L between the sensor S and
the attacker A1 to the transmission range R.
Figure 4 shows the performance comparison of the
following schemes: the scheme using only the temporal and
spatial properties (TSD), the scheme using the consistency
property of legitimate locators (CD) [9], B-TSCD, E-TSCD
and M-TSCD. For the M-TSCD scheme, we assume that the
sensor conducts the localization periodically and we denote
the distance for two consecutive localization processes as
the length of one step. We can see that all TSCD schemes
yield much better performance than the other two schemes,
especially when L/R is less than 2. Among these TSCD
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(1) Broadcast the Loc request message.
(2) Wait for the Loc ack message, conduct the distance
estimation and calculate the response time of each locator.
(3) Use the detection schemes D1 and D2 to detect attacked locators.
(4) if the attacked locators are detected then
(5) Treat previous detected attacked locators as current detected attacked locators.
(6) Update the historical data with current detected attacked locators.
(7) else
(8) Empty the historical data.
(9) end if
(10) if the current detected attacked locators ≥ 2 then
(11) Use the detection scheme D4 to detect other attacked locators.
(12) else
(13) Use the detection scheme D3 to detect other attacked locators.
(14) end if
(15) Conduct the MLE localization based on the remaining locators.
Algorithm 3: Mobility-aided TSCD secure localization scheme.
Locator
Sensor
Attacker
2R
L2
2R
2R
A1
S1
S2A2
Attack link
dx
L1
L3
dy
S
Figure 3: Theoretical analysis of the mathematical probability
under the distance-consistent spoofing attack.
schemes, E-TSCD achieves an improvement over B-TSCD,
and M-TSCD outperforms E-TSCD.
As the signals from attacked locators always come later
than that from legitimate ones, an intuitive approach,
referred to as first-three-locators scheme, is to only take the
first-three-signals from neighboring locators into account for
the sensor’s localization. However, due to the existence of
distance measurement errors, the first-three-locators scheme
will deteriorate the localization accuracy remarkably. The
reason is that it takes no account of the remaining legitimate
locators when there exist more than three legitimate locators.
Figure 5 shows the performance comparison of the first-
three-locators scheme and the B-TSCD scheme at diﬀerent
densities of locators. The simulation result shows that the
B-TSCD scheme outperforms the first-three-locators scheme
dramatically for all densities of locators.
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Figure 4: Performance of existing schemes and our schemes (the
step length is 0.25R for the mobility-aided TSCD scheme).
The eﬀects of ρl on the performance of B-TSCD and
E-TSCD are shown in Figures 6(a) and 6(b), respectively.
From both figures, we can see that as the ρl increases, the
probability of successful localization also increases. This is
mainly because the increase of ρl enlarges the probability
of detecting at least two attacked locators by the temporal
and spatial properties. However, when ρl is large enough,
the improvement of increasing ρl is insignificant. The
performance of B-TSCD, when ρl is large, is similar to that
of E-TSCD. Therefore, A tradeoﬀ can be made between
hardware deployment (applying B-TSCD when ρl is large)
and computation capability (applying E-TSCD).
The eﬀect of the step length on the performance of
M-TSCD is shown in Figure 7, compared to the E-TSCD
scheme. It can be observed that M-TSCD with diﬀerent
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Figure 5: Performance of the first-three-locators scheme and the
B-TSCD scheme.
step lengths all outperform E-TSCD. For M-TSCD, the
performance is increased when the step length increases.
However, as the step length increases, the probability that
the historical data are valid also gets lower. To get the best
performance, a tradeoﬀ of the step length should also be
taken into account.
Figure 8 validates the correctness of the theoretical anal-
ysis of the probability of successfully identifying all attacked
locators. The maximum diﬀerence between the simulation
and the mathematical result is about 3%, showing that the
theoretical analysis matches the simulation result quite well.
To study the time consumption of each scheme, we
conducted 20,000 times self-localization in a simulation
program running on a PC with Pentium 2.4 G CPU. Figure 9
shows the time consumed by TSD, CD, B-TSCD, E-TSCD,
and M-TSCD, respectively. Apparently, TSD scheme is the
most timesaving and CD scheme consumes the most time
since the detection scheme D3 is the most time-consuming
scheme. As E-TSCD uses the detection scheme D3 when
fewer than two attacked locators are detected by the detection
schemes D1 and D2, it requires more time than B-TSCD.
Compared to E-TSCD, M-TSCD increases the probability
of detecting at least two attacked locators, which lowers the
probability to use the detection scheme D3. Therefore, M-
TSCD always consumes less time than E-TSCD, and does less
than B-TSCD when L/R is over 1.5. When the L/R is over 2.5,
M-TSCD is even comparable to TSD.
Figures 10, 11, and 12 show the eﬀects of the packet
loss on the performance of B-TSCD, E-TSCD and M-TSCD
secure localization schemes, respectively. For the packet loss,
we assume that when the distance d between two nodes is
less than αR, there is no packet loss; when d is within [αR,R],
the probability of packet loss is (d − αR)/(R − αR), where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. From Figures 10, 11, and 12, we can find that
when increasing the packet loss ratio (reducing α), the secure
localization performance of our proposed three schemes will
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Figure 6: Performance evaluation: (a) the eﬀect of ρl on basic TSCD
scheme; (b) the eﬀect of ρl on enhanced TSCD scheme.
descend. However, even when α = 0.85, the descending scales
of the performance of the three schemes are limited (less
than 10%), which indicates that our proposed schemes are
eﬀective when the packet loss exits.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we address the distance-consistent spoofing
attack in hostile wireless sensor networks and discuss the
drawbacks of the existing secure localization schemes. Based
on the secure properties of wireless communication under
the distance-consistent spoofing attack, we propose three
secure localization schemes: basic TSCD, enhanced TSCD
and mobility-aided TSCD. We evaluate the performances
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of our proposed schemes and compare them with exiting
schemes by simulations. The simulation results demonstrate
that our schemes outperform the existing schemes under the
same network parameters.
In this paper, we assume that no region is attacked by
multiple attacks simultaneously. When a sensor is attacked
by several attacks simultaneously, it will be very complicated
and diﬃcult to obtain secure localization. A potential solu-
tion is to separate the localization from the attack detection.
That is, when multiple attacks are detected, the system
can try to identify the locations of the attackers and then
eliminate them. We will focus on the detection of multiple
attacks and the localization of the attackers in the future
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Figure 9: Time consumption of existing schemes and our schemes
(the step length is 0.25R for the mobility-aided TSCD scheme).
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Figure 10: The eﬀect of α on basic TSCD scheme.
work. In the M-TSCD scheme, we have a precondition that
the distance between two consecutive localization processes
is relatively short so that when a distance-consistent spoofing
attack occurs on the current state it is impossible for another
diﬀerent distance-consistent spoofing attack to occur on
the previous state or the next state. A possible solution to
release this precondition is to verify whether it is attacked by
the same attacker by checking its neighborhood of the two
consecutive states. The M-TSCD scheme will be conducted
only if the node verifies that it is attacked by the same attacker
on the two consecutive states. Thus, the other direction of
our future work is to release this precondition.
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Figure 11: The eﬀect of α on enhanced TSCD scheme.
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